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The volatility of short-term capital flows (or ‘capital surges’) is now recognized as a major
problem for macroeconomic management in developing countries; but the consequences for the
‘real’ economy - that is, the behaviour of government, firms and households which subsequently
translates into investment, growth, employment and welfare - is less well understood. Short-term
capital flow instability arises from the desire of investors to hold liquid assets in the face of
uncertainty; affecting the real economy both through variations in both prices such as the
interest rate and the exchange rate, and quantities such as levels of bank credit and government
bond sales. In this chapter, government expenditure is shown to respond in an asymmetric
manner to sudden changes in investor perceptions of fiscal solvency associated with portfolio
capital surges. The impact of  short flows on output and investment by firms through the
availability of bank credit is also found to be large and asymmetric. The macroeconomic effect
of capital surges on employment levels and the real wage rate is shown to arise from their
influence on real exchange rates and domestic demand levels, although whether employment or
wages adjust depends the monetary stabilization policy adopted. The chapter concludes with
some implications of the analysis for longer-term growth and policy design. 
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1. Introduction
The benefits to developing economies - particularly those classed as ‘middle-income’ or
‘industrializing’ countries - of their comparatively recent integration to international capital
markets are clearly substantial:  access to international savings allows the rate of investment (and
thus industrial progress and income growth) to be raised and the effect of exogenous shocks to
be dampened on the one hand, and of the gains in efficiency from transfers of competitive
technology and financial skills on the other (IMF, 1997). None the less, there is increasing
concern as to the destabilizing effect of short-term capital flows after financial liberalization,
which can bring about sudden shifts in real exchange rates, domestic interest rates, asset values
and domestic credit levels (IDB, 1995). National authorities are frequently forced to undertake
sudden shifts in fiscal and monetary policy in order to offset such shocks, while international
institutions become even further involved in policy conditionality and last-resort lending. In
consequence, interest in the feasibility of controls over short flows has grown - in forms ranging
from specific taxes and restrictions on overseas borrowing by firms to counterpart deposits and
active sterilization policy (see d’Arista & Griffith-Jones in this volume). 
This concern about the impact of short-term capital movements clearly goes beyond immediate
concerns with systemic risk in the financial system arising from the differing maturity of assets
and liabilities and the consequences of uncertain expectations being transmitted from one
institution or market to others (‘contagion’). It is often implied that the ‘real economy’ - that is
production, investment, wages, social services etc - is in some way negatively affected by these
flows, although the transmission mechanisms involved are not fully specified. First,  it is
suggested that relative prices are shifted by the inflows (and subsequent outflows) of capital - that
is by the acquisition of domestic financial assets by non-residents (and their subsequent sale) -
in a manner which distorts resource allocation decisions, particularly through fluctuations in the
exchange rate and the domestic interest rate. Second, it is argued that aggregate demand
fluctuates abruptly due both to changes in the money supply brought about by shifts in the foreign
exchange reserves held by public and private financial institutions as capital flows in or out, and
to monetary interventions by the authorities in the attempt to manage the balance of payments.
Third, the fluctuations themselves are felt to raise the level of country risk which depressesQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 3
foreign investment and makes government borrowing abroad more difficult, with long-term
consequences for growth and employment. 
None the less, debate has focussed on the appropriate combination of institutional reform and
macroeconomic policy required to reduce this instability, rather than on the economic
consequences of the instability itself. This seems unwise, not just because such fluctuations
might notionally have no negative consequences and this would not a matter for policy concern,
but - more significantly - because unless the consequences for the real economy are clear it is
difficult to see how an appropriate policy might be designed. In fact, it is not even clear what the
consequences for the real economy are in industrializing countries of short term capital flows
beyond those flows routinely generated by the monetary authorities (or private banks) in order
to maintain operational liquidity - such as short-term borrowing to balance the annual foreign
exchange cycle for a coffee-exporting economy. Logically, there might be three types of negative
consequences. First, the short-term flows might have a distorting effects on key macroeconomic
variables (such as the real exchange rate) during the inflow, and even though these were to be
reversed in a subsequent outflow, the cumulative inflow could have negative effects on real
investment or growth. Second, the consequence of the matching inflow and outflow be negative
due to asymmetric effects on real variables such as production, investment, employment, wages,
tax revenue or government expenditure. Structural adjustment which in the case of long-term
capital inflows would be efficient, might become inefficient when policy reversal on the capital
outflow is difficult or further distorts the economy. Third, the fluctuations in asset values, credit
levels, interest and exchange rates or even the rate of growth itself might have a negative effect
on business expectations. Increased uncertainty might depress private investment levels, reduce
the efficiency of public expenditure and force economic agents to adopt liquid positions and
hedge their wealth through capital flight. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore these ‘real effects’ in some depth, not only  because this
does not appear to have been done sufficiently in the literature but also in order to contribute
analytical support to the empirical findings in the country case chapters of this volume. We shall
focus on the short and medium term, although clearly financial liberalization and integration to
international capital markets clearly have important longer-term implications for sustainableQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 4
growth and income distribution (Dutt, 1996; FitzGerald, 1996).
This chapter opens with a discussion of the consequences of short-term capital flow instability
arising from the desire of investors to hold liquid assets in the face of uncertainty in Section 2.
The transmission mechanism towards the real economy is found to consist of two elements: the
indirect effect though price variables such as the interest rate and the real exchange rate; and the
direct effect through changes in the demand for bank deposits and government bonds. Section
3 examines the impact of short-term capital inflows and outflows on fiscal behaviour,
demonstrating that the shifts in the primary budget deficit consistent with solvency can shift
dramatically with investor sentiment, forcing large fluctuations in public investment expenditure.
The impact of these short flows on firms through the availability of bank credit is analysed in
Section 4, where it is shown that the impact on output and investment is not only considerable,
but also asymmetric. This then creates financial vulnerability in domestic firms and has serious
consequences not only for employment but also for long-term private investment as this is
particularly sensitive to uncertainty. In Section 5 the effect of these capital flows on employment
and the real wage rate is shown to be transmitted through the fluctuations in the real exchange
rate and aggregate output. However, the relative adjustment of employment and wages depends
upon the macroeconomic stance adopted by the government. Section 6 concludes with some
tentative  implications of the analytical results for national and international policy makers
concerned with mitigating the negative effects of short term capital flows. 
2. Capital Market Stability in Open Developing Economies
‘Short term capital flows’ take a wide variety of forms, but in this chapter are taken to include
the purchases (or sales) by non-residents of corporate equities and government bonds on local
capital markets, and their deposit (or withdrawal) of funds from domestic banks, with maturities
of less than one year. This working definition could easily be extended to include changes in the
net position of residents in foreign assets (‘capital flight’) without analytical difficulty, but this
reduced definition makes the exposition clearer. While resident financial investors are evidently
behave differently from non-residents, much of this difference arises from their respectiveQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 5
portfolio compositions - resident investors have a much greater weighting of local assets (‘home
bias’) - which leads to a different response to sovereign risk (Hallwood and MacDonald, 1994).
Access to information and control over investment outcomes also seems  to differ between
residents and non-residents, although here distinction may well be between large and small
investors rather than their location. Moreover, as the result of decades of  overseas asset
acquisition by domestic wealth-holders (‘capital flight’) not only do their portfolios have a large
foreign-exchange denominated component, but also that much of what appears to be ‘foreign’
portfolio investment inflows is often in fact the reduction of external asset positions by domestic
investors (‘repatriation of flight capital’). Finally, annual fluctuations in flows conventionally
regarded as ‘long term’ such as international bank loans, global bond issues and foreign direct
investment may also reflect short-term liquidity considerations, but they are not considered here
because, the stock of such capital cannot be sold by non-residents to residents through the
domestic capital market in the short run and thus the same destabilizing consequences for the
domestic economy do not occur. 
These fluctuations in short-term portfolio flows cannot sensibly be considered ‘perverse’. Indeed
the very attraction of the three short-term ‘portfolio’ assets identified here (equities, bonds and
deposits) to non-resident investors is precisely their liquidity. This means that uncertainty as to
future asset values can be to some extent controlled by the ability to dispose of these assets
quickly to a local market maker such as a commercial bank or the government treasury itself. In
contrast, international banks involved in long-term government loans attempt to reduce
uncertainty by inter-bank syndication, better information through their local branches and - in the
last resort - by obtaining support from international financial institutions; because their debt is
not traded locally. Again, a foreign corporation can reduce uncertainty about the future value of
its assets in the local economy by direct participation in management and - again in the last resort
- by appeals to international legal arrangements. In the absence of efficient insurance markets,
liquidity thus becomes the best means of hedging against uncertainty. High-risk emerging market
assets with high returns have a positive attraction for global portfolio investors because the
riskiness of their overall portfolio is considerably reduced by the low covariance between
regional markets; but this does not prevent fund managers from switching frequently between
markets in attempt to maximise short-term profitability.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 6
The volatility of portfolio flows thus cannot be attributed to investor irrationality or even to
‘speculation’ except in the technical sense of international or intertemporal arbitrage (Hirschliefer
and Riley, 1992). Rather it is the scale of these flows in relation to the size of the domestic
capital market - in terms of both the proportion of the domestic capital stock that is effectively
‘on the market’ and the size of the local market in relation to the international market in which
the non-resident investors operate - and the high covariance between asset prices within a given
developing economy or even region, which renders them problematic. In sum, although capital
movements towards ‘emerging markets’ should depend upon ‘fundamental valuation efficiency’
on the part of international portfolio managers in assessing future income streams; because this
is very difficult in practice and relies to a great extent on observing the behaviour of other
investors, so that in practice misallocation is widespread and sudden corrections are frequent
(Tobin, 1984).
Finally, there is a complex question of the direction of causality. In this chapter, for ease of
exposition, the changes in the short-term asset holdings of non-residents are considered to be
exogenous to fluctuations in the real economy - output, investment, employment and wages. This
seems justified for three reasons in this case. First, we are interested in the determination of real
economy and income distribution variables, rather than of capital flows as such. Second, it is
widely agreed that the larger part of the fluctuations in short-term capital flows to any one
developing country are caused by changes in global capital markets (IMF, 1994). Third, financial
markets - particularly in developing countries - are supply-constrained (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1992)
so that they are in stable disequilibrium with adjustments determined by creditors rather than
debtors because demand is in effect infinitely elastic at the equilibrium interest rate. In
consequence, it is not surprising that changes in the asset demand pattern (reflecting international
portfolio composition) of non-resident investors, rather than the supply of liabilities by residents,
can be taken as the immediate cause of short term capital flows in our case. 
The conventional view of the effect of capital flows in the policy literature derives from the
presumed mechanics of the ‘debt cycle’. External savings (ie the acquisition of domestic
financial assets by non-residents) raise domestic fixed capital formation and provide foreign
exchange, and thus potential output expands. Subsequently, domestic  saving rises too, which(Ig ￿ Sg) ￿ (Ip ￿ Sp) ￿ ￿A ￿ ￿D ￿ ￿R
(Ig ￿ G ￿ T) ￿ (Ip ￿ C ￿ Y ￿ T) ￿ M ￿ X ￿ ￿A ￿ ￿D ￿ ￿R
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eventually permits the debt to be repaid through an increased domestic surplus available to the
debtor (whether public or private) through increased tax yields or company profits.
Simultaneously, the excess of new saving over new investment should be reflected in an
increased surplus (or reduced deficit) on the current account of the balance of payments, which
provides the foreign exchange required to complete the cycle. This essentially optimistic picture
has been modified by experience since private capital flows returned to developing countries in
the early 1990s: the initial belief was that the virtuous circle could be guaranteed by eliminating
the fiscal deficit (or at least the ‘primary’ deficit before interest payments) so as to prevent excess
pressure on capital markets and the balance of payments; subsequently attention has been drawn
to the needs to strengthen the domestic financial system in order to prevent bank insolvency from
poor asset management in the face of liquid liabilities; and finally, there is a  a perceived danger
of capital flows being skewed towards non-traded sectors (not only through  the so-called ‘Dutch
Disease effect of exchange rate overvaluation but also due to speculative investment in sectors
such as real estate), so that the foreign exchange required to service debt and repatriate dividends
is not in fact available.
These relationships are reflected in the ‘accumulation balance’ - the national accounting identity
which relates the savings of the public sector (S ) and the private sector (S ) and investment in gp
the two sectors (I  , I ) on the one hand, and the changes in the short-term asset position of non- gp
residents (A), long-term external debt and foreign investment stocks (D) and the level of reserves
(R) on the other - which must hold ex-post at all times.
Public saving depends on fiscal revenue (T) and current expenditure (G), while private savings
are disposable income (Y - T) less consumption (C) so we have
In consequence if short term liabilities (A) rise ex-ante and the other capital account items (D,
R) are given, then one of the left hand side variables must adjust ex-post: the key issue in
evaluating the effect of short-term capital flows is to determine which variable or variables do
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In effect, if the debt cycle is to end virtuously, this adjustment must involve increased rates of
investment (Devlin, Ffrench-Davis and Griffith-Jones, 1995). Specifically: (i) capital inflows
should increase investment rather than consumption (dI/dA > dC/dA); (ii) the resulting
investment should be efficient in the sense of leading to factor productivity growth (dY/dA > 1);
(iii) investment must be in tradeables to create the required trade surplus (dX/dA > dM/dA); (iv)
and marginal savings rates must exceed the average (dS/dY > S/Y).
Apart from the longer-term effects on saving and investment, capital inflows are generally
regarded as being expansive in the sense of increasing domestic adsorption (Y), unless they are
fully sterilized by increasing reserves (R). Thus the orthodox policy response to short-term capital
flows is based on the need to maintain an external account target reflected in the maintenance of
a minimum and maximum reserves level. For instance, in the IMF ‘monetary programming
model’ (Khan and Huq, 1990), an autonomous inflow of capital will permit the government to
relax monetary policy and increase growth; a subsequent outflow would lead to the opposite
policy. However, this expansive process is not the same as an autonomous rise in government
expenditure (or even an export-led boom) because a financial asset has been acquired from a
domestic agent and much depends upon that domestic agent’s consequent response - to consume,
invest or acquire external assets in the case of private agents, or to spend, invest or reduce debt
in the case of government. The different maturity of the assets and liabilities created in this
process may also be crucial - a short-term deposit in a banking system is converted into a
medium-term loan to a firm, which acquires fixed capital. By the same token, a broad notion of
the ‘lifting of a foreign exchange constraint’ as in the World Bank ‘standard macroeconomic
model’ (loc cit.) does not seem very helpful unless we are considering an administered economy
where the central bank assigns foreign exchange directly to producers. It is necessary to define
more clearly how more or cheaper imports affect the behaviour for governments, firms and
households.
In practice, experience has shown that the conditions for a ‘virtuous debt cycle’ based on short-
time flows are very difficult to acheive, due in great part to the financial liberalization that makes
these flows possible. Unsterilized short-term capital inflows often lead to an unsustainableQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 9
appreciation of the exchange rate, which prevents export promotion and generates an import
boom, while the expansion of domestic credit tends to result in unsafe loans being made by banks
at low rates of interest in the expectation of rapid growth in not only income but also asset prices.
The subsequent outflow usually forces cutbacks in domestic adsorption to restore external
balance, which lead in turn to a fall in current output levels to the extent that rigidities prevent
resource reallocation, so that the contractionary disadsorption effects on non-traded sectors
outweigh any expansionary substitution effects in traded sectors. The fragile banking system
often then collapses under the pressure of bad debts and the fall of asset prices as interest rates
rise and domestic activity declines (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod, 1994). For example in both the
Chilean and Mexican crises in the early 1980s and mid-1990s respectively, banks played a key
role in the euphoric period before currency collapse. “Initially banks intermediated extremely
large - and unsustainable - capital inflows and helped finance the consumption boom. When,
largely as a result of exogenous shocks, capital inflows began to slow down, the demand for
deposits declined significantly and banks ran into financial difficulties, making the situation even
worse. When the crisis finally erupted, both countries experienced a large decline in output and
a major increase in unemployment” (Edwards, 1996: 2). 
Financial deregulation itself can effectively be regarded as a permanent shock to the banking
sector which alters the environment in which the intermediation is carried out (Bachetta, 1992).
Specifically, the lifting of regulations on asset portfolios and reserve ratios combined with
privatization are designed to encourage better risk management and narrower margins, but may
lead to excessive risk acquisition in the search for market share. Monetary policy becomes more
difficult to implement as the behaviour of monetary variables becomes more volatile with the
reduction in market segmentation and consequently increased elasticities of substitution between
assets (Melitz and Bordes, 1991). The high real interest rates associated with financial
liberalization actually increase banking fragility. As Minsky (1982) points out, a recession
generally causes a deterioration in the asset quality of financial intermediaries due to
bankruptcies in the real sector, although these problems are often seen as transitory by regulators
reluctant to intervene in major institutions due to the risk of contagion. Inflation and exchange
rate instability has usually given large windfall profits to banks before liberalization; but  lending
skills (such as risk appraisal) are generally weak due to the previous experience of oligopolizedi ￿ i$ ￿ (Ee ￿ E)/E ￿ ’
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credit markets. Banks cannot become efficient overnight as they have poor information on
borrowers and depositors may believe banks to be more solvent than they really are. Real interest
rates rise not because of an increase in real capital productivity but because of tight monetary
policy and competition with domestic government bond issues. Regulators appear to
underestimate the problems faced by an underdeveloped banking system with a weak domestic
savings base; because high interest rates and rising asset prices attract foreign portfolio investors
as well as generating large short-term profits and there are strong domestic pressures on
regulators to permit the boom in asset values to continue. It takes a number of years for distress
lending to build up to the point where bad loans cannot be rolled over any more; during which
time things seem to be going well and the reforms continue. The subsequent collapse of asset
values becomes contagious, spreading from individual firms to entire sectors, and eventually
affecting country risk evaluations.
This experience underlines the fact that local capital markets do not clear according to textbook
principles. The local interest rate does not perform the expected role of resource allocation for
two fundamental reasons. First, capital market market equilibrium is determined by quantity
adjustment, due to the prelevance of asymetric information and agency problems, which require
lenders to ration credit - and much the same is true of equity investors (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1992).
Second, financial intermedition involves the conversion of liquid into illiquid assets, and thus
the assumption of risk which cannot be expressed in interest rates due to the adverse selection
effect. In the face of incomplete financial markets - particularly for long-term assets - any large
imbalance tends to be thrown onto the most liquid markets, those for quoted securities an foreign
exchange. Third, interest rates in small open economies exposed to the international capital
market are not determined by the marginal productivity of capital or the intersection of the
investment and savings schedules, but rather by  three components: the international interest rate
(i ), the expected depreciation of the exchange rate (E - E) and the country risk proper (’): $ e  
Of these three terms, the first is clearly exogenous and fluctuates considerably in the short term;
the second depends not only on the current macroeconomic policy of the government but also
on expected policy in the future and fluctuations in other currencies; and above all, the third termQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 11
depends on foreign investors’ perceptions of the country in the context of changing
circumstances in the region and the world as a whole. The domestic interest rate is thus a
consequence of much the same domestic and external factors that determine short-term capital
flows, rather than being a market clearing mechanism as such. 
In consequence, in this chapter we shall adopt an approach which considers market economies
in general - and semi-industrialized countries in particular - to be characterised as ‘credit
constrained’ in the sense that firms require working capital in order to undertake production and
that this is limited by banks’ behaviour. Blinder (1987) sets out a complete exposition of a model
of a credit-constrained economy where supply is constrained by asymmetric-information type of
bank lending behaviour - which creates a category of ‘effective supply’ - upon which our
approach is based. Another approach to asymmetric shocks transmitted through the credit system
- based on interest rate spreads rather than credit rationing - which produces similar results is
suggested by Edwards & Vegh (1997). Interest rate changes we shall consider as essentially
exogenous too, with the exchange rate as the main instrument of government macroeconomic
policy. Portfolio flows are considered as affecting the real economy through their effect on bank
credit - for instance, the purchase of an existing security by a non-resident from a bank makes
more credit available, while purchase from an individual has much the same effect when she
deposits the proceeds in her bank account. Finally, if a new security is issued by a firm and
purchased by a non-resident, this can be seen as reducing the firm’s use of bank credit and thus
releasing this resource for other uses. Again, purchases of new government securities by non-
residents increases the resources available to the public sector. To this we now turn.  
3.  The impact on the real economy - I: government, borrowing and public investment
The main direct impact of short-term capital flows on the fiscal balance is through the conditions
on the government bond market: in particular the ability to maintain or increase the planned
public sector borrowing requirement at reasonable rates of interest. The key policy issue is
whether short-term capital inflows affect budgetary behaviour asymmetrically, causing capital
expenditure in particular to fluctuate more than other fiscal variables. QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 12
There are three other ways in which short-term capital flows can affect the budgetary balance
indirectly: 
Any variations in the exchange rate caused by capital flows will have an effect on the
budget, although the direction and scale depends upon the currency composition of
income and expenditure: normally the main effect will be through the cost of external
debt service, so capital inflows causing appreciation improve the budget balance; but in
the case of primary exporters where revenues are dollar-based such appreciation may
even cause a deterioration;
Fluctuations in the domestic interest rate accompanying capital inflows will also impact
on the cost of debt service: in theory inflows should cause interest rates to fall (and thus
reduce the budget deficit) but in practice as these inflows are closely associated with
financial liberalization involving high real interest rates, and to the extent that these
inflows are sterilized by the monetary authorities the reverse may turn out to be the case;
however, outflows will generally be accompanied by further increases in interest rates;
To the extent that monetary policy has become less effective due to the integration of
capital markets, or confined to a single target such price stability, fiscal policy will have
an increased role in the maintenance of macroeconomic stability and countering external
shocks; in the face of revenue inflexibility and large fixed commitments to wagebills,
transfers and debt service, capital expenditure may become the only macroeconomic
instrument  available to do this. 
None the less, the impact of short-term capital inflows and outflows on fiscal behaviour is mainly
felt through the local bond market, the creation and expansion of which has been one of the main
features of financial liberalization. The impact is not so much through the interest rate itself as
through market perception of fiscal solvency, which is in effect a form of credit rationing. 
Formally fiscal solvency can be said to exist when the discounted sum of future income (T) and
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words, that debt can eventually be paid off, rather than rising exponentially in what is known as
a ‘Ponzi game’
Conventionally, fiscal solvency models assume that fiscal revenue and expenditure are constant
ratios of GNP (r, g), that there is a fiscal surplus (r > g) and that the growth of output (y) and
interest rate (i) are fixed to an infinite time horizon (i > y), so that the solvency condition is
simply reduced to a critical debt-output ratio (z) 
In practice, such parameter stability does not occur and fiscal consolidation tends to lie in an
uncertain future. It is more realistic to regard governments (and bond purchasers) as targeting a
particular debt to GNP ratio (z*) which reflects their assessment of the prospects of fiscal
consolidation (r, g), output growth (y) and capital market conditions (i) without perfect foresight;
at best, this ratio should fall over time and at worst should not rise. IMF-inspired stabilization
programmes can be viewed in a similar manner. This in turn produces the familiar rule for the
level of the primary (ie before interest payments) fiscal deficit as a proportion of  GNP (c),
through the accounting definitions that link the debt level (D), GNP (Y), the rate of  amortization
of the debt (d) and the gross borrowing requirement (B)
From this accounting balance the minimum level of the primary fiscal balance consistent with
fiscal solvency is derived, based on the requirement that the debt ratio (z) does not rise over time




f￿￿c ￿￿i . z ￿
￿z ￿ . y
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The corresponding fiscal deficit (f*) consistent with debt solvency is then found to be:
This ‘rule of thumb’ is precisely parallel to that for the acceptable current account deficit
consistent with the ratio of external debt to GDP; with the current account deficit net of factor
payments replacing the primary budget deficit.
However, in the case of large short-term capital flows into (and out of) a developing country we
are considering by definition disequilibrium situations. In general the debt ratio desired by the
government is larger than that which international investors regard as sustainable (due perhaps
to asymmetric information but more probably to distinct incentives) so that the government is
in effect rationed by not being able to place sufficient bonds on the local capital market under
acceptable conditions to fund the programmes it desires to undertake. The circumstances of the
inflow of short-term capital are almost always characterized by a marked change in market
perceptions as to the sustainable public debt ratio (z*) due to improved expectations for economic
growth, exchange rates and country risk in the future. These expectations are often reinforced by
the effects of public enterprise privatization, even though the revenue is rarely used to write off
debt. In addition, aggregate output will rise as aggregate liquidity expands.
Consider the situation where as a result of these changes, the (apparently) sustainable level of the
debt ratio (z*) rises sharply between the initial level in one period (0) and the next period (1),
these rate being maintained in the following period (2). In consequence, not only does the
permitted fiscal deficit (f), rise, but in the ‘transition’ period (1) this deficit can be very large in
order to adsorb the sudden change in the debt ratio (from z  to z  ) in addition to the increased ab
growth rate (y  to y  ) arising from the demand expansion a bf0 ￿ za.ya
f1 ￿ (zb ￿za) ￿ za.yb
f2 ￿ zb.yb
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In practical terms, the effect is large, as the table below shows. For quite modest but realistic
changes in the parameters (z*, y), the acceptable (ie ‘apparently compatible with public debt
solvency’) fiscal deficit shifts suddenly from 0.8 percent to 6.2 percent of GNP in the period of
transition; thereafter, with the debt ratio stabilized at its new value, the fiscal deficit settles at 1.2
percent of GNP. The corresponding primary fiscal balance (before interest payments) moves
from zero - the target of orthodox monetary policy - through a relatively large yet apparently
sustainable deficit of nearly 5 percent of GNP before returning to a modest surplus in order to
meet increased interest charges.     
Percent of GDP: Before Inflow  During Inflow After Inflow
(Period 0)  (Period 1) (Period 2)  
Debt ratio target (z*) 25.0 30.0 30.0
Growth rate (y) 3.0 4.0 4.0
Target fiscal deficit (f) 0.75 6.2 1.2
Real interest rate (i) 3.0 5.0 5.0
Primary fiscal balance (c)  0.0 - 4.9 0.3
The subsequent result is familiar: once foreign investors see the macroeconomic result of their
individual decisions sentiment shifts back suddenly, probably even to a lower solvency ratio (z*)
than before the shock. In consequence the market demands that the government achieve a large
fiscal surplus (ie the previous exercise in reverse) in order to finance the repayment of enough
of the existing debt stock to reduce the debt ratio sharply. Hopefully. This would now be
followed by a new equilibrium in the medium term, but meanwhile panic selling of government
bonds sets in when the foreign exchange reserves are insufficient to permit them to be cashed in
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The government is obliged to adjust the remaining fiscal variables in order to allow for the
exogenous fluctuations in its borrowing capacity. Tax revenue is difficult for developing
countries to adjust in the short run, and in practice it appears that public investment takes the
main brunt of the shock. This can be for one (or both) of two reasons. The first is the traditional
rule that budgetary borrowing should only be used for capital expenditure (Heller, 1975), so that
the current expenditure and revenue budget can be kept in balance. In consequence, any
fluctuation in the primary deficit would be fully reflected in public investment expenditure. The
second is the practical fact that when borrowing capacity rises, it is always politically attractive
for governments to initiate new projects to gather political support; while when there is a need
to reduce the deficit, it is always politically easier to postpone promised investment programmes
rather than lay off teachers and nurses. In view of the fact that current expenditure is of the order
of 20-30 percent of GNP in emerging market economies, while public investment is 5-10 percent,
a shift of the order of 5 percent of GNP in the fiscal balance hypothesized above can clearly have
a disproportionate effect on capital expenditure. 
The consequences of these sharp fluctuations in public investment (even if the mean is stable
over the longer term) are clearly negative, due to the inability of public services such as transport,
health and education to maintain an effective development programme. This leads to losses in
efficiency both when new projects are implemented without proper planning in order to take
advantage of unanticipated resources while they are available, and when ongoing projects are
delayed or frozen during construction. Furthermore, reductions in public investment due to lack
of access to capital markets have negative multiplier effect on private investment and thus on
employment levels in the economy as a whole (FitzGerald and Mavrotas, 1997). 
4. The impact on the real economy II - firms, output and private investment
Short-term capital flows clearly have a marked affect on credit availability, because the inflows
directly affect the deposit base of the banking system in a number of ways: through direct
deposits of funds or purchases of bank paper, through the deposit of the proceeds of equity sales
to non-residents, through the reduction of government credit requirements due to bond sales toQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 17
non-residents, and through the general relaxation of monetary policy which tends to accompany
them. The reverse will be true with outflows, exacerbated by bad debt accumulating in banks'
asset portfolios - as has been discussed in Section 2 above.
In developing economies (and indeed in most developed ones too) firms do not rely on securities
markets directly for their long-term funding requirements; relying rather on retained profits for
the bulk of their investment funds, and relying on bank finance for much of their working capital.
In addition, the control of companies in developing countries is usually retained by families
groups or foreign corporations; so securities markets do not act as a medium for ‘disciplining’
management as a controlling shareholding cannot be obtained through the open market. Of
course the control of domestic corporations is not the objective of non-resident portfolio
investors, or even the receipt of dividends - but rather capital gains on the resale of the securities
as the aggregate market index rises. In consequence, the long-run effect of portfolio capital
inflows on private sector fixed capital formation in LDCs has been found to be insignificant
(FitzGerald et al, 1994; FitzGerald & Mavrotas, 1997). This also explains why equity markets
in developing countries are so narrow and shallow - and thus oscillate widely in response to
changes in foreign investor interest. 
Of course, if equity markets in developing countries do not represent a significant source of fresh
investment capital of a way of improving firms’ efficiency; then it might appear to follow that
equity market fluctuations would not have a great effect on firms' behaviour and thus could act
as an efficient ‘buffer’ for volatile capital flows by adsorbing any consequent risk element.
Unfortunately this is not the case, because the aggregate effect of stock market fluctuations on
expected variations in external reserves and monetary policy is considerable. 
Firms’ response to changes in short-term capital flows can be conveniently analysed through the
effect of changes in bank credit, therefore. In principle, the effects of variations in international
credit extended directly to large domestic firms would be similar. Consider a representative firm
with a capital structure (C) made up of variable capital (V) for wages, inputs, inventories etc,
fixed capital (K) as assets, and bank credit (D) and own equity capital (S) as liabilities. The
balance sheet is then:V ￿ K ￿ C ￿ D ￿ S
Q ￿ a.V ￿ b.K
K/V ￿ ￿ ￿ a/b
S ￿ S￿1 ￿ s.Q ￿ i.D
C ￿ S ￿ D ￿ S￿1 ￿ s.Q ￿ (1 ￿ i)D
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The level of output (Q) at a given level of prices is directly related to the amount of variable
capital (V) committed to production, and is which is in turn constrained by the level of fixed
capital:
The firm has a desired ratio (￿) between variable and fixed capital when there is also full
utilization of capacity (Q = b.K) so that
This ratio we assume corresponds to the point of maximum efficiency in the sense of maximising
the net present value of the firm to its owners (Sen, 1994), so the firm will attempt to adjust
towards this capital structure in the long run. The firm also has a desired balance (￿) between
loan capital (D) and its ‘own’ capital (S) made up of equity and reserves - which can only be
increased out of retained profits (we ignore dividend payments an new equity issues for
convenience), themselves a constant proportion (s) of net output (Q). The firm has a demand for
bank credit, expressed a gearing ratio between debt and equity, based on its optimal exposure to
creditors which in principle depends on interest rates and tax patterns. However, in a credit-
constrained economy the level of debt desired by the firm is not met so loan capital (D) is
exogenously set by the banks on the basis of collateral available in the form of assets which can
be resold by the creditor.
At the credit-constrained equilibrium, the firm thus has a liability structure determined by its own
past saving and its exogenously determined borrowing capacity: 
In order to maximize profits, the firm will adjust its output and thus its asset structure, so that











0Q ￿ (1 ￿ i)
￿





I ￿ 0K ￿ (1 ￿ i)
b.￿
.0D
QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 19
The firm’s continual adjustment of the balance between assets and liabilities yields the level of
output (Q) as a function of the level of credit (D):
From which the level of working (V) and fixed (K) capital can be directly derived. Note that the
level of output (Q) will depend not only positively on the level of credit (D) but also negatively
on the interest rate (i) as this affects retained profits and thus the ability to finance production
from the firm’s own resources.
We are interested in the consequence of fluctuation in short-term capital flows, which produce
similar fluctuations in bank credit levels (D). The result is asymmetric as can be seen by
examining the result of a credit increase followed by an equal decrease. An increase in credit (0D
> 0) allows output to rise proportionately by providing resources for working capital, but as the
form is already at full capacity, fixed assets will rise (ie investment is undertaken) as well. rise.
Specifically, 
Employment will increase proportionately to production, and new fixed investment (I) is
determined by   
Finally, if (for simplicity of exposition) we assume that increased short-term deposits of foreign
capital (0A) are all passed on to firms in the form of bank credit (net of the banks’ reserve0A >0 ; 0 Q￿￿ (1 ￿ i)
￿(1 ￿ n)
.0A ; I ￿ (1 ￿ i)
b.￿(1 ￿ n)
.0A
0Q ￿ (1 ￿ i)
1
0D ; 1 ￿ 1
a
￿ s < ￿
0A <0 ; 0 Q￿ (1 ￿ i)
1(1 ￿ n)
.0A ; I ￿ 0
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requirement, n) then we have:
Now, if bank credit falls (0D < 0) by the same amount, the effect is not ‘equal but opposite’,
fundamentally investment decisions are irreversible (Dixit and Pindijk, 1994) - in other words,
fixed assets once installed cannot easily be sold  - especially on a declining market - so it is not
possible to adjust the fixed capital stock downwards to achieve the new (credit-constrained)
desired capital structure. Because K is fixed, all the downward adjustment must be undertaken
by reducing working capital (V) and thus output (Q), so that:
In other words, the downward movement of firms’ output following a given outflow of short-
term capital will be much larger than the upward movement in output following an inflow of the
same size, while fixed investment is zero:
As a consequence, the greater variability of capital flows and bank credit around the mean, the
lower will the average output level be. In other words, volatile capital flows reduce output and
investment.       
Unless the short term capital flaws are fully sterilized, there is presumably a close correlation
between capital flows and the domestic rate of interest: either because perceived risk declines
(rises) and stimulates greater inflows (outflows) at a given international interest rate; or because
the international interest rate falls (rises) and there are greater inflows (outflows) for a given risk.
This correlation will reinforce the asymmetric effect on output and investment:  the capital inflow
will drive down the interest rate (i) and thus stimulate output (Q) and investment (I) even more
due to the increase in resources available to the firm; vice-versa for the capital outflows. The
fluctuations in domestic output and investment will thus be even larger than in our simple modelQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 21
- in other words, local capital markets will have a pro-cyclical effect rather than buffering
external shocks. 
The scale of these shocks can be considerable. Suppose a plausible parameter set (a = 0.5, b =
0.3, s = 0.1, i = 0.05, and n = 0.2 ) then the consequences of a unit inflow of short-term capital
(“one million dollars”) are shown in the table below. On the one hand the output decline on the
downswing ($0.59 mn) is nearly three times greater than on the upswing ($0.70 mn). On the
other hand, although on the downswing investment is zero by construction, on the upswing the
increase in fixed investment ($0.70 mn) is less than the capital inflow. This is a phenomenon
result that is well known from the empirical literature - as domestic investment has risen by less
than foreign savings, domestic savings must have fallen (by $0.30 mn in this case). Further, if
for simplicity we assume that all the working capital (V) is used for wages, and that the wage (w)
is fixed, so that employment (L) is simply given by changes in working capital. For a wage rate
of a plausible order of magnitude (w=0.004, that is roughly $2 an hour) then a $ 1 mn capital
inflow would generate 110 jobs, but the same outflow would lose 295 jobs.
capital inflow  (0A > 0)  capital outflow (0A < 0)
￿   5.23
1   1.90
0Q   0.22 - 0.59
I = dK   0.70    0.00
0L = 0V/w  110 - 295
  
In sum, it is clear that: (i) capital flows have a considerable effect on levels of output but the
effect is asymmetric, with outflows depressing output more than an equal inflow raises it; (ii)
these effects are exacerbated by the response of interest rates; (iii) the  investment effect is also
asymmetric even though capital inflows are only partially translated into fixed investment; and
(iv) domestic savings fall with capital inflows and rise with outflows.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 22
5. The Impact on the Real Economy III - households, employment and wages.
Households are affected by real macroeconomic shocks through the level of employment and
wages on the one hand, and the availability of government services and bank credit (particularly
for residential construction and consumer durables purchases) on the other. To a great extent,
therefore, the impact of short-term capital flows on households will reflect the consequence of
the response of the fiscal and firms sectors to external shock in the way described above. Three
responses are of particular importance to households:
The negative effect of these flows on public investment stability, and thus on the effective
provision of social  infrastructure; leading to a reduced suppply of and effectiveness in
health and education services, public transport systems and urban services;
The asymmetric effect of these flows on the volatility of corporate output, and thus on
the level of current 'formal sector' employment and, through the level of  investment on
longer term employment;
The negative effect of these flows on capital market and exchange rate volatility, and thus
on the level of private investment; with long-term consequences for the level of
sustainable employment and thus income distribution.
However, the most significant negative consequence on welfare is probably - as in the case of
trade liberalization - felt through the long term consequences for private investment, because this
(rather than low wage rates or even labour skilling) is the main source of sustainable long-term
employment (FitzGerald and Perosino, forthcoming). None the less, the broader effect of capital
flows on the real exchange rate is of considerable interest, because this affects the level of
aggregate employment in the economy as a whole (including the small-scale sector) and the level
of real wages through relative prices. 




b1 ￿ (%b ￿ %a) ￿ %a.yb
b2 ￿ %b.yb
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on external debt(D) and short-term assets (A); which is balanced by changes in short term assets
held by non-residents, changes in external debt and changes in reserves (R).
As in the case of fiscal solvency, external debt solvency relates to the long-term ability to repay
external debt; and from this a sustainable debt-to-GNP, or debt-to-exports, ratio can be derived
(World Bank, 1997b). On exactly the same basis as our analysis of fiscal debt solvency set out
in Section 3 above; the level of current account deficit (b) as a proportion of GNP consistent with
a stable external debt to GNP ratio (%) and a given GNP growth rate (y) is given by:
Again, as in the case of the fiscal deficit, when asset demand constrains the international capital
market, a small change in the perceived creditworthiness of a particular country permits a large
increase in current account deficit that foreign investors will finance, but this is a transitory
feature:
As the following table shows, relatively small shift in non-resident investors’ view of
creditworthiness (ie %) generates a large current account deficit (5 percent of GNP) financed from
short-term inflows, during the transition period. This in turn permits an ‘import boom’ with
imports rising by one-quarter even though GNP growth rates have only risen slightly, if the
authorities take no compensatory action. The mechanics of this boom often take the form of
banks extending consumer credit backed by the short-term capital inflows; rather than extending
it to companies as in our earlier model. This boom is not sustainable, however, and to remain
consistent with market expectations of solvency the current account should be closed again in
the subsequent period and imports should fall sharply again even if the capital inflow is not
reversed.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 24
In practice, halting an import-and-credit boom generated by short-term capital inflows is very
difficult: partly for the technical reason that reducing credit levels to consumers implies rapid
repayment of debt which cannot be achieved by selling the corresponding household assets (eg
houses or consumer durables); and partly for the political reason that the euphoric sense of
economic success is difficult to abandon. In consequence, it is not surprising that the authorities
seek to sustain the boom in the hope that further short term capital inflows can be attracted.
However, when foreign investors reach the conclusion that the deficit is unsustainable, the
reverse process starts. Capital outflows require that the domestic economy generate a large
surplus on the current account of the balance of payments (5 percent of GNP in this case); and
when drastic reductions in domestic demand have caused widespread bankruptcy and household
distress, to borrow heavily from international financial institutions in order to - in effect - acquire
the domestic assets of non-resident investors.
Percent of GNP: Before Inflow  During Inflow After Inflow
(Period 0)  (Period 1) (Period 2)  
External Debt ratio target (%*) 50.0 55.0 55.0
World Interest Rate (i) 4.0 3.5 3.5
GNP Growth Rate (y) 3.0 4.0 4.0
Target Current Account Deficit (b*) 1.5 7.0 2.2
Exports (X) 20.0 20.0 20.0
Imports (M) 20.5 25.2 20.3
Resource Balance (X - M) 0.5 - 5.2 - 0.3
Factor Payments (i.%*) 2.0 1.8 1.9
Actual Current Account Deficit (b) 1.5 7.0 2.2
The macroeconomic consequences depend upon the policy response of the authorities to the
capital inflow - whether to adjust the real exchange rate or the level of activity. Consider the
situation where external trade is a function of the real exchange rate (e) and the demand - world
output (H) for exports and domestic output (Y) for imports, respectively. SoM ￿ m1.Y ￿ m2.e ; X ￿ x1.W ￿ x2.e
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Policy makers can, in principle at least, achieve any current account balance (CAB) in response
to an external capital flow; which then determines how much the reserves change (that is, how
much of the inflow is sterilized) if long term debt is taken as given:
The desired current account deficit can be attained by adjusting either the real exchange rate (e)
or the level of domestic output (Y) - or both - by an appropriate monetary and fiscal stance in the
familiar way. As we shall see, the employment and wage effect of short-term capital flows
depends crucially on which stance is adopted. 
Consider two scenarios. First, if output is held stable (conventionally by fiscal means) then
Second, if the real exchange rate is held stable (conventionally by monetary means) then
Note that we are assuming the short flows do not affect the other balance of payments parameters
(x, m); this reflects the fact that their positive effect on efficiency or export capacity is much less
than that of FDI.
In the case of a capital inflow, an active monetary policy would involve some domestic inflation
in order to force up (ie devalue) the real exchange rate and allow output to rise, which may well
be politically unattractive. This may be the reason why in Latin America there has been a
tendency to allow exchange rates to appreciate during periods of short-term capital inflow, due
to the recent experience of high inflation; will in Asia, with less inflationary experience, there
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outflow of short capital, exactly the reverse situation should hold; but as nominal prices are more
or less rigid downwards in practice, it is much more difficult devalue the real exchange rate than
to revalue it, so that a forced reduction in output (Y) is much more likely. In sum, an inflow
followed by an equal outflow is likely to have an asymmetric character: the real exchange rate
falling (ie appreciating) with the inflow, and output falling on the outflow.
We can now go on to analyse the employment and wage effects of this cycle. In LDCs there is
widespread unemployment and surplus labour held in the informal sector; so that employment
can rise without inflationary consequences if output rises unconstrained by the balance of
payments. The employment effect can thus be seen as the effect of the increase (or decrease) in
aggregate demand if the real exchange rate (and thus real wages, as we shall see) is held steady.
Consider an aggregate production function has the familiar form
Then under these circumstances we can simply derive
The impact on real wages is a little more complicated, but may be derived using the approach set
out in Dornbusch (1980). The real exchange rate is defined in terms of the relationship between
the nominal exchange rate (E), domestic prices (P) and world prices (p); and the real wage rate
(w) as the ratio between the nominal wage rate (W) and domestic prices
World prices are of course exogenous, but domestic prices are formed by a markup (r) on costs
composed of labour inputs (u) and imported inputs (m) so that
These three relationships yield a simple expression of the real wage in terms of the real exchange
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wage
In the case where output (Y) does not vary, we can derive a relationship between short term
capital flows and the real wage rate, where an inflow causes the real wage to rise and vice versa:
This analysis of the response of the real exchange rate and aggregate demand to short term capital
inflows and outflows also reveals asymmetric implications for wages and employment. The real
exchange rate rises on the inflow, but does not fall proportionately on an equal outflow; so that
aggregate demand falls more on the outflow than it had risen on the inflow. To the extent that
real wages will rise with the inflow but employment will remain the same. With the outflow, real
wages would not fall but employment would decline. As a key problem of income distribution
is the balance between the incomes of the employed and those of the un- (or under-) employed;
fluctuations in external capital flows can be expected to have a negative effect on income
distribution. 
6. Conclusions: Volatile Capital Flows, Private Investment and Public Policy
In this chapter the following general propositions have been established with respect to the
impact of exogenous changes in short-term capital flows:
the main direct transmission effects on the real economy are through variations in credit
available to firms and in the demand for government bonds; the main indirect effects are
through variations in the real exchange rate and the level of economic activity;
the impact on the fiscal sector is mainly seen in sudden shifts in the perceived solvency
of the public sector, and thus upon the level of debt believed by foreign investors to beQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 28
sustainable; the effect of these fluctuations is felt in volatile levels of public investment,
which reduce the efficiency of public provision of infrastructure and social services;
the impact on the firms sector is mainly through the supply of working capital, which
generates asymmetric responses in terms of investment and output due to the impact on
firms’ balance sheets; the volatility of expected profits resulting from this has a strong
depressive effect on private investment;
the impact on the household sector is the result of the employment and wage effects;
these occur both directly through firms’ response to short term capital flows, and as a
result of the consequences of fiscal instability; and also indirectly through the effects of
real exchange rate variations on real wages and aggregate employment levels. 
However, there is a further and potentially even greater consequence of  volatile short-term
capital flows for private investment, and thus for the growth of employment and productivity in
the longer run. This is derived from the effect of this volatility on the expectations of firms about
the profitability of investment through the impact of macroeconomic variables such as the real
exchange rate as well as the credit conditions for the firm itself.
Most investment expenditures are largely irreversible - sunk costs that cannot be recovered if
market conditions turn out to be worse than expected. In an open developing economy these
conditions are as much the consequence of macroeconomic conditions as they are of the
circumstances of a particular sector. As firms can delay investments until more information
arrives,  there exists an opportunity cost of investing now rather than waiting. In consequence,
the value of a unit of investment must exceed the purchase and installation cost, by an amount
equal to the value of keeping the investment option alive - which will increase with the level of
uncertainty (Dixit and  Pindyck , 1994). Increased uncertainty will reduce the level of private
investment: for reasonable parameter values, a standard deviation  as low as 20 percent in annual
profit expectations can generate an option value of twice the original investment cost - requiring
a far higher expected rate of return in order to justify investment. In consequence, the literature
on irreversible investment suggests that if the goal of macroeconomic policy is to stimulateQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 29
investment (and thus growth), stability and credibility may be much more important than
particular levels of taxes or interest rates (Pindyck and Solimano, 1993). What is more, policy
reforms such as tax incentives designed to stimulate investment may themselves have very little
effect if there is a probability that the policy will be reversed (Rodrik, 1989).   These findings
would apply a fortiori to short-term capital flows.
Aizenmann and Marion (1996) on the basis of data for 43 LDCs over 1970-92 find a significant
negative correlation between various volatility measures and private investment - these being the
standard deviations of fiscal, monetary and external (effective real exchange rate) variables.
Although they do not test for short-term capital flows directly, their variables clearly respond to
changes in the determinants of these flows and can thus be considered as empirical support for
the findings of this chapter. Their results hold even when standard control variables are included
- initial school enrolment rate, initial population growth rate, and the average trade share in GDP.
Firms are not in fact a homogeneous group in LDCs, and do in practice react in quite different
ways to similar macroeconomic shocks (FitzGerald, 1995). The affiliates of multinational
corporations will not face the same liquidity constraints as local firms as they can always rely on
their headquarters as ‘lender of last resort’, or raise credit from international banks with the
international assets of the corporation as implicit collateral. Large domestic firms - often
organized as ‘groups’ - have preferential access to bank credit at any one time (often because they
have a bank within the group) and thus should suffer less from capital market fluctuations.
Indeed it is often the case that banks are vulnerable to the non-financial firms in the group rather
than the other way around. In contrast, independent domestic firms are the most vulnerable to
shifts in bank credit. Small enterprises outside the formal credit system are also vulnerable to the
business cycle because they rely on sub-contracts from larger firms or the expenditure of wages
by their employees. 
The policy implications of the argument set out in this chapter are possibly of some interest. The
design of the appropriate macroeconomic policy should logically be preceded by an identification
of the causes of the original fluctuation in short term capital flows  - and indeed a judgement as
to whether this represents a temporary or a permanent shock. Flows which will soon be reversedQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 30
would presumably be handled through compensatory reserve management, while permanent
flows require some form of macroeconomic adjustment - in the absence of   any clear basis for
such a judgement, the proverbial admonition to “treat all positive shocks as temporary and all
negative shocks as permanent” is a good guide. None the less, the source of fluctuations in short
capital flows vary widely: alterations in local conditions (both structural such as banking
liberalization and privatization, and policy shifts such as in interest rates), changes in
international capital markets (such as variations in prudential regulation or in domestic asset
yields), or perhaps - and most importantly, as we have seen - shifts in the perceived risk
associated with a particular market. Each source implies a distinct policy response: for instance,
increased demand for money domestically can be countered by monetary accommodation, while
a change in international perceptions of risk may be best handled by sterilization of capital flows
- particularly if the policy objective is to maintain a stable real exchange rate in order to promote
exports. However, the overriding goal should presumably be to maintain high rates of private
investment in traded sectors through macroeconomic stability and low real interest rates.
Such ‘fine tuning’ is not easy, particularly since much of its effect depends upon the reputation
of the economic authorities. Indeed,  Obstfeldt (1995) suggests that because of the international
integration of capital markets the only way to reduce the shocks arising from external capital
flows is either a completely clean float or an irrevocable currency union. However, a pure float
is probably unworkable in most developing countries due to the fact that monetary aggregates
do not provide a reliable policy anchor, particularly in a period of financial liberalization. In any
case, the resulting fluctuations in real exchange rates would have the negative real-economy
effects we have discussed above. Monetary union is not a feasible option for most developing
countries - and for those for which it is a real prospect  (such as Mexico) the fiscal implications
for the central economy of the region (eg the USA) are probably unacceptable. In practice,
therefore the options appear to be: the design of fiscal policy to reduce the pressure on domestic
debt markets;  sterilized intervention as the basis of monetary policy, combined with a strong
reserve level and low real interest rates; high but flexible marginal reserve requirements on banks
in order to mitigate the effects of capital flows on credit provision; and active management of the
nominal exchange rate in order to maintain a stable, competitive real exchange rate. QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 31
However, as Reisen correctly points out “...with heavy capital flows, no single policy will do to
simultaneously target money and exchange rates and to aim for external as well as internal
balance.” (1996: 93). In consequence, meso-policies are also required. The direct implications
of this chapter for such policies can be summarized as follows:
Sustain public investment programmes by avoiding the use of short term debt as a source
of funds; undertake a tax reform sufficiently extensive to generate a structural fiscal
balance; and avoid the refinancing of long-term external debt with short term internal
debt;
Avoid high real rates of interest, which do little to stimulate aggregate savings, but clearly
depress private investment and in this context, attract volatile capital flows while
increasing the budgetary cost and also the vulnerability of domestic firms. 
Ensure that long-term credit is available to firms in order to sustain private investment
through the cycles caused by short-term capital flows; possibly by the provision of
rediscount facilities at the central bank and tax incentives to long-term profit retention;
Protect small firms and homebuilding from the effect of credit restrictions by dedicated
loan schemes; and restrict the capacity of larger firms and banks to borrow abroad if this
makes their capital structures vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations;
Maintain a stable real exchange rate in order to avoid excessive fluctuations in real wages
resulting from capital inflows and outflows; using capital flows sterilization and variable
reserves requirements on banks in order to avoid fluctuations in employment.
Insofar as domestic capital markets form part of a global capital market, the stabilizing measures
listed above would be greatly strengthened by appropriate action at an international level. In
particular, international taxation and regulatory arrangements could provide the incentives to
foreign investors to support longer-term investment in tradeable production and human capital
formation in developing countries (FitzGerald, 1997). Insistence by international financialQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 32
institutions on financial deregulation and capital account liberalization alone as ends in
themselves (eg World Bank, 1997a), without a clear view of the implications for the ‘real
economy’, is not generally consistent with sustainable economic development.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 33
References
Aizenman, J. & N.P. Marion (1996) ‘Volatility and the investment response’ Working Paper
5841 Cambridge MA: NBER
Bachetta, P. (1992) ‘Liberalization of capital movements and the domestic financial system’
Economica  465-7
Blinder, A.S. (1987) ‘Credit rationing and effective supply failures’ Economic Journal 97: 327-
352
Devlin, R, R. Ffrench-Davis and S. Griffith-Jones (1995) .......... [editors’ will supply reference]
Dixit, A.K. & R.S. Pindyck (1994) Investment under Uncertainty Princeton NJ: Princeton
University Press 
Dornbusch, R. (1980) Open Economy Macroeconomics New York, NY: Basic Books
Dutt, A.K. (1995) ‘Interest rate policy, growth and distribution in an open less-developed
economy: a theoretical analysis’ in  P. Arestis & V. Chick (eds) Finance, Development and
Structural Change Aldershot: Edward Elgar
Edwards, S. (1996) ‘A tale of two crises: Chile and Mexico’ NBER Working Paper 5794
Edwards, S. & C.A. Vegh  (1997) ‘Banks and macroeconomic disturbances under predetermined
exchange rates’ Working Paper Series 5977 Cambridge MA: NBER
FitzGerald, E. (1995) ‘Hamlet without the prince: structural adjustment, firm behaviour and
private investment in semi-industrialized economies’ in P. Arestis & V. Chick (eds) Finance,
Development and Structural Change Aldershot: Edward Elgar
FitzGerald, E. (1996) ‘International capital markets and open-economy macroeconomics’ OxfordQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 34
Development Studies 24.1: 79-92
FitzGerald, E. (1997) ‘Intervention versus regulation: the role of the IMF in crisis prevention and
management’ UNCTAD Review 1996 Geneva: United Nations
FitzGerald, E., K. Jansen & R. Vos  (1994) ‘ External constraints on private investment decisions
in developing countries’ in J-W. Gunning (ed.) Trade, Growth and Development London:
Macmillan 
FitzGerald, E. & G. Mavrotas (1997) International capital flows, investment and employment in
developing countries Geneva: ILO
FitzGerald, E.V.K & G. Perosino (forthcoming) “Trade liberalization, employment and wages:
a critical approach” in Fiani, R. (ed) Labour Markets and Poverty in Developing Countries
Oxford: Oxford University Press
Hallwood, C.P. & R. MacDonald (1994) International Money and Finance (2nd ed.) Oxford:
Blackwell
Heller, P.S. (1975) ‘A model of public fiscal behaviour in developing countries: aid, investment
and taxation’ American Economic Review   65.3: 429-445
Hirschliefer, J. & J.G. Riley (1992) The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
IDB (1996) Economic and Social Survey Progress in Latin America 1995 Washington DC: Inter-
American Development Bank
IMF (1994) World Economic Outlook, October 1994 Washington DC: International Monetary
FundQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 35
IMF (1997) World Economic Outlook, May 1997 Washington DC: International Monetary Fund
Khan, M.S. & Haque, N.U. (1990) ‘Adjustment with growth: relating the analytical approaches
of the IMF and the World Bank’ Journal of Development Economics 32: 155-179
Mathieson, D. & L. Rojas-Suarez (1993) ‘Liberalization of the capital account: experience and
issues’ IMF Occasional Series 103
Melitz, J. & C. Bordes (1991) ‘The macroeconomic implications of financial deregulation’
European Economic Review 155-78
Minsky, H.P. (1982) ‘The financial-instability hypothesis’ in C.P. Kindelberger & J.-P. Laffarge
(eds) Financial Crises Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Obstfeldt, M. (1995) ‘International currency experience: new lessons and lessons relearned’
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:119-220)
Pindyck, R.S. & A. Solimano (1993) ‘Economic instability and aggregate investment’ Working
Paper 4380 Cambridge MA: NBER
Reisen, H. (1996) ‘Managing volatile capital inflows: the experience of the 1990s’ Asian
Development Review vol 14.1 72-96 
Rojas-Suarez, L. & S.R. Weisbrod (1994) ‘Financial market fragilities in Latin America’ IMF
Working Paper 117  
Sen, P  (1994) ‘Saving, investment and the current account’ in F. van der Ploeg (ed.) The
Handbook of International Economics Oxford: Blackwell  
Stiglitz, J.E. & A. Weiss (1992) ‘Asymmetric information in credit markets and its implications
for macroeconomics’ Oxford Economic Papers 44: 694-724QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS08 Page 36
Tobin, T (1984) ‘On the efficiency of the financial system’ Lloyds Bank Review No 153
World Bank (1997a) Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries: the road to financial
integration New York, NY: Oxford University Press
World Bank (1997b) Global Development Finance 1997 Washington DC: World Bank